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Abstract
Through cultural transmission, repeated learning by new individuals transforms cultural infor-
mation, which tends to become increasingly compressible (Kirby, Cornish, & Smith, 2008; Smith,
Tamariz, & Kirby, 2013). Existing diffusion chain studies include in their design two processes
that could be responsible for this tendency: learning (storing patterns in memory) and reproducing
(producing the patterns again). This paper manipulates the presence of learning in a simple iter-
ated drawing design experiment. We find that learning seems to be the causal factor behind the
increase in compressibility observed in the transmitted information, while reproducing is a source
of random heritable innovations. Only a theory invoking these two aspects of cultural learning will
be able to explain human culture’s fundamental balance between stability and innovation.
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1. Introduction
Social transmission, or social learning, whereby knowledge is passed on generation
after generation by imitation, copying, or teaching, is the key process in cultural evolu-
tion (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; contributions to Heyes,
2012; Heyes, Huber, Gergely, & Brass, 2009). The role of social transmission as an agent
of change in human culture has been widely studied using the transmission or diffusion
chain method. In this paradigm, the cultural productions of an individual are used to train
the next individual (e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Bangerter, 2000; Esper, 1925; Kalish, Griffiths,
& Lewandowsky, 2007; Kashima, 2000; Kirby et al., 2008; Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar,
2006). Repeated observation and production can amplify even weak transmission biases
(e.g., a preference for simpler concepts) in such a way that, over time, the transmitted
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information comes to reflect those biases (e.g., simpler concepts come to prevail;
Brighton, Kirby, & Smith, 2005; Kirby, Dowman, & Griffiths, 2007).
We claim that a key adaptation of cultural information in response to social transmis-
sion is compressibility. Compressibility is a property of information inversely related to
Kolmogorov, or algorithmic, complexity. For a compressible system, it is possible to
write a description whose length (in bits of information) is only a fraction of the length
of the system itself. The smaller the fraction, the more compressible—and therefore sim-
pler—the system. Compressibility is adaptive for a system that is being culturally trans-
mitted because it makes patterns easier to learn and store in memory (Chater & Vitanyi,
2003) and therefore more likely to persist over cultural time.
A growing number of studies show that cultural systems, when repeatedly learned
or used, do become increasingly simple or compressible (or decreasingly complex); for
example, drawings become more schematic (e.g., Galantucci, 2005; Garrod, Fay, Leed,
Oberlander, & MacLeod, 2007), and sets of sounds and languages acquire regular struc-
ture (Kirby et al., 2008; Perfors & Navarro, 2014; Theisen-White, Kirby, & Oberlander,
2011; Verhoef, Kirby, & Padden, 2011).
Another instance of this adaptation is the fact that repeatedly transmitted knowledge
becomes increasingly conventional. In his classic theory of remembering, Bartlett (1932)
highlighted the influence of “schemata,” or existing memory patterns based on experience,
on remembering, and reproducing new information. Bartlett used the transmission chain
method—which he called “serial reproduction”—in experiments where a participant was
exposed to and later asked to reproduce a story or a drawing. One of the conclusions from
this and similar experiments is expressed by Bartlett (1932, 185) when he said that the item
produced “sooner or later (. . .) tends to assume the form of accepted conventional represen-
tations.” Bartlett’s thinking went to form the basis of cognitive theories of meaning and cul-
ture (e.g., Fillmore, 1977; Langacker, 1987; Minsky, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977).
Sperber’s (1996) epidemiology of representations theory also incorporates this bias toward
pre-existing, conventional knowledge, which he considered constitute “cultural attractors.”
The cultural transmission chain experiments cited above typically involved a partici-
pant (generation) being exposed to some data, and then reproducing them. Each partici-
pant, therefore, had to do two distinct tasks: learning (holding the information in
memory) and reproduction (producing it again). In this study, we manipulate the presence
of learning to explore its causal relationship with the observed increase in compressibility
(conventionality and simplicity). If the increase in compressibility is caused by repeated
reproduction, we expect that our manipulation will have no effect. But if the increase in
compressibility is specifically due to holding information in memory, we expect to see an
increase in compressibility in that condition only.
2. Methods
We carried out a transmission chain study using a graphical task where chains of
participants were exposed to a drawing and immediately were asked to reproduce it as
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faithfully as possible. In the Memory condition, the model drawing is removed from view
before reproduction; therefore, the participants were forced to learn it and hold it in mem-
ory for a few seconds. In the Copy condition, the model drawing remains in full view
during reproduction, thus removing the need for learning at all. The requirement for
reproduction was similar in both conditions. We then examined how the complexity and
conventionality of the drawings changed over time.
2.1. Participants
A total of 308 participants took part in the study (54% female). Given the very short
time each participant had to invest in the experiment, we chose to approach students
directly during their free time in the courtyards of the faculties of Humanities and Psy-
chology in the University of Seville, Spain and in the Students’ Union buildings at the
University of Edinburgh. The experimenter introduced herself as a researcher and briefly
explained that she was carrying out an academic experiment, unrelated to any sales or
advertising purposes, and then asked the potential participant whether he or she would
like to participate, stating that the whole thing would take a maximum of 2 min. The few
students who showed signs of rejection were dismissed. The rest were invited to sit down
in order to proceed.
At the analysis stage, six additional participants were paid £10 each for judging all the
drawings.
2.2. Materials
Each transmission chain was initialized with one of the drawings shown in Fig. 1,
drawn on a white A5 card with a black edding 1,200 felt-tip pen. The participants were
handed similar white A5 cards and the same pen to produce their drawings.
2.3. Procedure
Each participant was asked to examine a drawing for 10 s. After this time, the experi-
menter either removed the drawing from sight (in the Memory condition) or left it in sight
(in the Copy condition) and handed the participant a blank card and a felt-tip pen as she
asked him to copy the drawing as accurately as possible. The process of handing the card
and paper took about 3–4 s in both conditions. Participants were not told what their task
would be after looking at the drawing for 10 s in either condition. When he or she had fin-
ished drawing, the participant was asked to write down a brief description of the drawing
he saw on another piece of paper (this was not analyzed in the current study).
We ran a total of 16 transmission chains, eight in the Memory and eight in the Copy
condition, with 22 participants each. Half of the chains in each condition were initialized
with one of the drawings in Fig. 1, and half with the other. The first participant in each
chain was shown the initial drawing and the rest were shown the drawing produced by
the previous participant in the chain.
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2.4. Analyses
2.4.1. Perimetric complexity
We measured the perimetric complexity (PC) of each drawing following the algorithm
in Pelli, Burns, Farell, and Moore-Page (2006), namely the squared length of the inside
plus outside perimeters of a drawing divided by the ink area contained within those
perimeters. Pelli et al. show that this complexity metric is an accurate negative correlate
of the efficiency of object recognition. The complete process of each drawing involved
scanning, saving in PNG format with maximum contrast (black on white only), and cal-
culating PC.
Perimetric complexity is scale-invariant, provided the line thickness scales up with the
size of the drawing. Scaled-up versions of a drawing will yield the same PC, but the
same drawing produced in different sizes with the same pen (same line thickness) yields
PC values proportional to drawing size.
Our drawings decreased in size over rounds, especially in the Memory condition (see
Fig. 2a and b). Given that the drawings were all executed with the same pen, they had
varying ratios of line thickness to overall drawing size. This compromises the accuracy
of PC as a measure of complexity; therefore, we used an additional measure that proved
scale-independent for our drawings, and therefore insensitive to the size confound—
algorithmic complexity.
2.4.2. Algorithmic complexity
We estimated a proxy of the algorithmic or Kolmogorov complexity of each drawing
by measuring the size in bytes of the compressed file of each drawing after several trans-
formations, aimed at giving the smallest representation of the drawing that we could:
First, they were scanned and saved in PNG format; the resulting drawings were then
cropped to their bounding boxes, which were resized to low-resolution and identical areas
(10,000 pixels) and then vectorized with the POTRACE algorithm (Selinger, 2003) into
Fig. 1. The two initial drawings in the transmission chains.
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FIG format. Finally, the vector representations (descriptions of the drawings in terms of
shapes, curves, etc.) were zipped to get rid of any remaining simple redundancies. The
result is an impressively compressed format, but the figures still look very close to the
originals when displayed (see Fig. 2). The rescaling step sometimes introduced pixela-
tion-style artifacts, which show up in the vectors. Specifically, some of the very small
drawings are actually up-sized rather than down-sized For instance, the smaller drawing
in Fig. 2(b) is enlarged at resizing and small ink imperfections in the edges of the line
are blown up (Fig. 2b). In contrast, the larger drawing (Fig. 2a) is reduced at resizing
and equivalent ink imperfections disappear. This artifact of the method means that the
vectorized file descriptions of smaller drawings—but not those of larger ones—may end
up longer than they should be. See, for instance, drawings (a) and (b) in Fig. 2: If we
take the original PNG files, (a) is much larger than (b), but when we consider the vector-
ized files, then (b0) is actually a bit larger than (a0). This biases the results in favor of
increased complexity in smaller drawings; in other words, our metric of complexity is
likely to underestimate the difference between larger and smaller drawings, and, since
drawings tended to be larger in the Copy condition than in the Memory condition, any
difference between conditions will also be underestimated. As such, this is a conservative
measure, given our hypothesis.
Complexity (the reverse of compressibility) was quantified as the size of the cropped
vectorized files in bytes.
Perimetric and algorithmic complexity scores were submitted to repeated-measures
ANOVAs with Reproduction condition (Memory or Copy) as between-subjects factor and
Round (0–22) as within-subjects factor. Even though each drawing was produced by a
different individual, it is appropriate to treat Round as within-subjects here because units
of analysis in transmission chain studies are chains, not individual participants. Initial
(a)
(a′)
(b′)(b)
Fig. 2. Two of the drawings from the experiments in two different formats: left, cropped PNG format file;
right, the resized vectorized version. File sizes in kilobytes given for each drawing.
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drawing (1 or 2) was included as an additional between-subjects factor to check for its
effects. Cumulativeness over rounds was calculated with Page’s trend test; overall change
in complexity was calculated comparing the values at the initial and final rounds with a
paired t test.
2.4.3. Conventionality
Six people rated all the drawings each for whether they represented something recog-
nizable or not on a 7-point Likert scale. Judging was done in an online form where all
354 drawings (22 in each of 16 chains plus the two initial drawings in Fig. 1) appeared
in sequence, in a random order, on the screen next to a 7-point Likert scale. The instruc-
tions specified that 1 should be given if they thought the drawing represented something
conventionally recognizable (including symbols like letters and numbers), in other words,
if they were confident that different people would agree on what the drawing represented.
On the opposite end of the scale, 7 should be given if they thought it did not represent
anything conventionally recognizable and they thought different people might give diver-
gent interpretations of what the drawing represented. With this question, we tried to avoid
people rating the drawing as recognizable if they happened to see something in the draw-
ing that was meaningful to them in an idiosyncratic way—almost any drawing can be
creatively interpreted as something recognizable, but we were trying to measure conven-
tional recognizability.
The inter-rater agreement was calculated, and Mann–Whitney and Wilcoxon rank tests
were performed to examine the effect of Reproduction condition (Memory vs. Copy) as
well as Initial drawing (1 vs. 2) on conventionality rates.
3. Results
Inspection of the drawing chains (Fig. 3) impressionistically reveals that drawings in
both conditions do change, but in different ways. In the Memory condition, they become
less complex, tend to turn into conventional symbols like letters and numbers, and
become smaller (see Fig. 4, left) over rounds of transmission. In the Copy condition,
however, drawings maintain the original complexity to a higher degree and remain mean-
ingless.
3.1. Complexity
The ANOVA on the PC values revealed significant main effects of Round (F(22, 264) =
16.030; p < .001), Reproduction condition (F(1, 12) = 51.788; p < .001) and initial draw-
ing (F(1, 12) = 18.292; p < .01), and significant Round 9 Reproduction condition (F(22,
264) = 2.405; p < .01) and Round 9 Initial drawing (F(22, 264) = 4.829; p < .001)
interactions.
The main effect of Reproduction condition is due to less complex drawings being pro-
duced in the Memory (M = 731.4, SD = 852.2) than in the Copy conditions (M = 2,069
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SD = 1,083; see Fig. 4, right). The main effect of Round is due to an overall decrease in
PC over rounds. This decrease is cumulative, as indicated by significant Page’s L
(m = 16, n = 23, L = 62,087, p < .001) and t test (t(15) = 4.322, p < .001).
The effect of Initial drawing is due to chains initialized with drawing 1 (Fig. 1, left;
Drawing 1: M = 1,797.29; SD = 1,252.01) achieving lower complexity values than chains
initialized with drawing 2 (Fig. 1, right; Drawing 2: M = 1,002.62; SD = 955.03).
The Round 9 Reproduction condition interaction is illustrated in Fig. 4 (right). In
order to explore this interaction further, separate repeated-measures ANOVA with Round as
within-subjects factor were carried out in the Memory and Copy conditions. There was
an effect of Round in the Memory condition (F(22, 132) = 33.053, p < .001), and an also
significant, but much smaller one in the Copy condition (F(22, 132) = 2.398, p < .01).
This difference is confirmed by t tests: The difference in complexity between initial and
final rounds is significant in the Memory (t(7) = 6.557, p < .001), but not in the Copy
condition (t(7) = 1.643, p = .140). These results indicate that the drawings in the Mem-
ory condition lose complexity faster than in the Copy condition.
Fig. 3. A selection of resized, vectorized drawings from the experiments, in two of the Memory chains (top)
and two of the Copy chains (bottom). Initial drawings (0) plus drawings at rounds 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 16, 19, and
22 are shown. The different thickness of the lines is due to the original drawings being resized: smaller draw-
ings are enlarged, and therefore have thicker lines.
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As for algorithmic complexity values, the ANOVA revealed significant main effects of
Reproduction condition (F(1, 12) = 13.968; p < .01) and Round (F(22, 264) = 4.186;
p < .001), and a Round 9 Reproduction condition interaction (F(22, 264) = 2.662;
p < .01). There was no main effect of Initial drawing, nor any interactions of this factor
with any others, further indicating that, in our data, PC may be influenced by size while
algorithmic complexity is not.
The main effect of Reproduction condition is due to less complex drawings being pro-
duced in the Memory (M = 985.6, SD = 270.5) than in the Copy conditions (M = 1,356,
SD = 286.5). The main effect of Round is due to an overall decrease in file size over
rounds. This decrease is cumulative, as indicated by a significant Page’s L trend test
(m = 16, n = 23, L = 59,644, p < .01), and there is a significant difference between val-
ues at rounds 0 and 22 (t(15) = 2.862, p = .012).
The interaction between Round and Reproduction condition is illustrated in Fig. 5. In
order to explore this interaction further, separate repeated-measures ANOVA with Round
as within-subjects factor were carried out in the Memory and Copy conditions. There
was an effect of Round in the Memory condition (F(22, 132) = 7.340, p < .001), but
not in the Copy condition (F(22, 132) = 0.606, p = .866). This difference is confirmed
by t tests: In the Memory condition the decrease in complexity is significant (t(7) =
12.26, p < .001) and also cumulative: m = 8, n = 23, L = 26,614, p < .001. In
the Copy condition, although the values descend cumulatively (m = 8, n = 23, L =
28,848, p = .003), the complexity at the final round is not lower than that at the start-
ing round (t(3) = 0.176, p = .866). This analysis indicates that the interaction is due to
an overall decrease in complexity over rounds in the Memory but not in the Copy
condition.
Fig. 4. Size (left) and perimetric complexity (right) of the drawings in the Copy and Memory conditions, by
Round (95% confidence intervals shown).
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3.2. Conventionality
The Likert scale scores from the six raters showed a high inter-rater reliability (Pear-
son’s R range (0.30–0.68), all p < .001).
Mann–Whitney and Wilcoxon rank tests on all scores collapsing across rounds
revealed a significant effect of Reproduction condition on Likert scores (U = 311,675;
W = 866,606 (N = 1,047), p < .001), with drawings in the Copy condition rated as more
abstract than those in the Memory condition (Fig. 6, left). There was also a significant
effect of Initial drawing (U = 476,979.5, W = 1,032,964.5, p < .001), with drawings from
chains initialized with drawing 2 were rated as more abstract than drawings in chains ini-
tialized with drawing 1.
Mann–Whitney and Wilcoxon tests were performed to examine the effect on Likert
scores for each of the 22 rounds of Reproduction condition (Table 1; see Fig. 6, right for
median values) and Initial drawing (Table 2).
The results in Table 1 indicate that the rates accorded to the drawings in the Memory
and the Copy conditions are similar until round 2, after which they become significantly
different. The initially arbitrary drawings began to be rated as significantly more conven-
tional in the Memory condition at round 3, while in the Copy condition they continued to
be rated as highly arbitrary until the final round.
The results in Table 2 indicate that the rates accorded to the drawings in chains initial-
ized with both drawings are similar in all rounds except 10 and 17–22.
4. Discussion
The algorithmic complexity and conventionality results indicate that the manipulation
in the Memory condition—the learning aspect of cultural transmission, namely learning a
Fig. 5. Algorithmic complexity of the drawings in the Copy and Memory conditions, by Round (95% confi-
dence intervals shown).
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drawing and holding it in memory for a few seconds—resulted in an increase in com-
pressibility (low complexity and high conventionality). The Copy condition, where this
small amount of learning was absent because the original drawing was in full view during
reproduction, yielded very different results: The items retained the complexity and arbi-
trariness of the random drawings used to initialize the chains.
The increase in compressibility in the Memory condition came about in at least two
ways. First, by losing complexity: The drawings were gradually simplified in form by
Fig. 6. Left: distributions of Likert scale values 1–7 given to the drawings in the Memory and Copy condi-
tions, collapsing across Rounds. Right: median Likert scale scores given to drawings in rounds 0–22, by
Reproduction condition. Higher values indicate the drawings are rated as highly arbitrary and lower values,
as highly conventional.
Table 1
Mann–Whitney’s U and Wilcoxon’s W values and significance of reproduction condition (Copy or Memory)
by round, calculated with 48 judgments per round per condition
Round U W p Round U W p
1 879 2,055 =.045 12 521 1,679.5 <.001
2 890 1,971 =.115 13 735 1,863 <.003
3 722 1,850.5 =.002 14 746 1,922 =.002
4 598 1,774.5 <.001 15 588 1,716 <.001
5 471 1,647 <.001 16 636 1,812.5 <.001
6 585 1,709 <.001 17 578 1,659 <.001
7 629 1,805 <.001 18 504 1,494 <.001
8 584 1,712.5 <.001 19 622 1,798.5 <.001
9 726 1,902.5 <.002 20 448 1,624 <.001
10 649 1,825 <.001 21 519 1,600.5 <.001
11 579 1,755.5 =.000 22 506 1,682 <.001
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becoming smaller, and by being made up of fewer and shorter lines (as in Fay, Garrod,
Roberts, & Swoboda, 2010; Garrod et al., 2007) and thus became more learnable. This is
what experiments and computer models carried out in the last few years predict (Kirby,
2001; Kirby et al., 2007, 2008; Smith et al., 2013; Theisen-White et al., 2011; Verhoef
et al., 2011). Second, transforming into conventional signals like letters or numbers (as
cognitive theories of memory would predict, e.g., Bartlett, 1932; Fillmore, 1977; Langacker,
1987; Minsky, 1975; Schank & Abelson, 1977) may also contribute to compressibility. Our
approximation of Kolmogorov complexity is based on the length of description of the
lines in the drawings, but it does not take into account any meaning the drawings may
convey. However, if we had used an algorithm that was able to understand about letters,
numbers and other recognizable patterns, the description of some of the drawings could
be as short as “letter R with a line and a dot underneath” (Fig. 3, second chain), in com-
parison with the much longer descriptions that would be required for the last drawings in
the two copy condition chains at the bottom of Fig. 3.
The drawings in the Copy condition also changed, but for different reasons than those
in the Memory condition. The innovations introduced here were random, in the sense that
they were unbiased with respect to pre-existing meanings and with respect to complexity.
They may have been caused by production error—we would in fact predict that if the
participants in this condition were trained artists, the drawings would change at a slower
pace because there would be fewer production errors. Some of these random innovations
were reproduced in an unbiased way by the following generations. The effects of this
reproduction modality are introducing and retaining random mutation as happens in neu-
tral evolutionary dynamics, or drift.
In the Memory condition, on the contrary, not all innovations had an equal chance to be
reproduced: Those that were better adapted to the compressibility biases would be prefer-
entially reproduced, or selected for, and the least fit in this sense would be selected
against. Once the cultural system attained an optimal level of simplicity and conventional-
Table 2
Mann–Whitney’s U and Wilcoxon’s W values and significance of Initial drawing (1 or 2) by round, calcu-
lated with 48 judgments per round per condition
Round U W p Round U W p
1 1,034 2,210 =.359 12 1,092.5 2,268.5 =.651
2 982.5 2,110.5 =.247 13 991 2,167 =.230
3 1,082 2,136 =.861 14 917.5 2,093.5 =.108
4 1,120 2,296 =.809 15 912 1,993 =.139
5 1,024 2,200 =.334 16 991.5 2,119.5 =.300
6 1,110 2,286 =.756 17 769.5 1,945.5 =.006
7 1,052 2,248 =.550 18 792.5 1,873.5 =.035
8 1,094.5 2,270.5 =.799 19 821.5 1,997.5 =.013
9 932 2,108 =.136 20 737 1,913 =.002
10 810.5 1,986.5 =.016 21 662.5 1,838.5 <.001
11 973 2,149 =.117 22 718 1,894 =.001
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ity, the pressures derived from keeping something in memory ceased to act, and the pro-
cess of adaptation ended. Figs. 5 and 6 illustrate this limited selection effect, where com-
plexity and arbitrariness values, respectively, undergo a rapid descent before stabilizing
in the Memory condition. This is also what happens in studies that initialize transmission
chains with a random language (Kirby et al., 2008; Perfors & Navarro, 2014), or a ran-
dom set of items (Kalish, Griffiths, & Lewandowsky, 2007; Verhoef et al., 2011), which
cumulatively evolve to become highly compressible, and then stabilize.
This study thus shows that culturally transmitted information is affected differently by
different aspects of social transmission. First, it provides an original demonstration that
direct reproduction can introduce innovations that are random with respect to cognitive
biases, and retain those innovations across the generations. This random-mutation-and-
retention process can maintain complexity and arbitrariness in cultural traditions. Second,
the study crisply demonstrates that when behavior is transmitted through the bottleneck
of learning (even if this bottleneck is as tiny as remembering a drawing for a matter of
seconds), then we see a cumulative increase in compressibility.
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